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I

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

LEROY R. CLARK, et al,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
Case
No. 9005

-vs.JAMES T. EREKSON, et al
Defendants arnd Respondents.

BRIEF O,F RESPONDENT'S

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Statement of Facts appearing in the brief of
Appellant Clark is substantially more accurate than that
appearing in the brief of Appellant Thompson. To avoid
confusion Respondents elect to restate the facts. There
has existed for more than fifty (50) years, and Respondents contend since prior to the issuance of any patents
to land in the area, a road running North and South at
what would be 7th East Street from Vine Street on the
North to 5900 South Street on the South. Immediately
North of the juncture of this road and Vine Street, Vine
1
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Street runs in a 'North and South direction for a substantial distance and the West fence line of Vine Street
and the West fence line of the road in question are in
direct alignment.
At a point approximately five hundred feet South of
the juncture o! the road in question with Vine Street,
Appellant Clark was the owner of a tract of land abutting
the road on the East and Respondent Crabtree is the
owner of tract of land abutting the road on the West
immediately opposite the Clark property. Respondent
Erekson is the owner of land abutting upon the West side
of the road both North and South of the Crabtree property and lan? abutting upon the East side of the road
South of the Clark property. In December, 1953, Respondents Clark conveyed the North portion of their
property being that immediately opposite the Crabtree
property to Respondent Clyde R. Thompson. The description in this Deed so far as it relates to the West line
of the property, that is the property abutting upon the
road, is substantially different than the description of the
West boundary in the Deed by which Clark acquired title
to this property, the difference being that the West
boundary of Clark's property as described in his deed
of acquisition, was the center of an open street, "four
chains East of the Southwest corner of the Northwest
corner of Section seventeen ( 17) '', and was a due North
and South straight line, whereas in his deed of conveyance to Respondent Thompson, he described the West line
of the property as commencing at. a point 3.74 chains East
from the same quarter corner. The West line also ~hows
2
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an offset of .754 rods, and a course South 0 degrees 18
minutes 30 seconds East, rather than a North-South
course. Clark endeavored to obtain from Respondents a
Quitclaim Deed to the property representing the difference between the land he acquired and the land which
he deeded Appellant Thompson and when Respondents
refused to give him such a deed, he commenced this action.
The road from Vine Street down to the North boundary of what is now the Thompson property, was the subject of an action in 1928 in the Third District Court of
Salt Lake County, Case No. 40279, between J. T. Erekson,
father of Respondent Erekson, and McClanahan, who
was the owner of the property on the East side of the
road in question, located immediately North of the land
of Respondents.
In that case the Court found that the road was a public road and that it was forty-six feet in width. This case
has not been reversed or the Decree modified. Up until
1924 ,at a point approximately forty ( 40) feet South of
the North boundary of what is now the Thompson property, an artificial pond protruded from what is now the
Thompson property into the road a distance of some
twenty (20) to twenty-five (25) feet, and there was no
fence separating the pond from the traveled portion of
the road. About 1924 the then owner of what is now the
'rhompson property caused most of the pond protruding
into the road to be filled with dirt which he took from
other parts of the roadway and he then constructed a
fence, to divide the remaining portion of the pond from
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the roadway, at a point approximately forty ( 40) feet
East of the West fence line of the then road. Some three
(3) or four ( 4) years later a different owner of the now
Thompson property moved a building from the Northeasterly portion of the now Thompson land out into what
was then the East half of the road and built a fence
along the West side of the garage at a point approximately twenty-five (25) feet East of the West line of the
road to a point approximately forty ( 40) feet South of
the North boundary line of the property. The fence went
thence East approximately twenty-five (25) feet and
thence North to the North boundary line. At the same
time he planted some trees along this fence line North of
his garage. Subsequently, the fence was moved back to
its previous location at a point some forty (40) feet East
of the West line of the road. The trees and the garage
have remained in their present position since about 1928.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
PoiNT

I.

IS THERE A PUBLIC ROAD RUNNING NORTH
AND SOUTH BETWEEN THE PROPERTY OF
APPELLANTS AND THE PROPERTY OF
DEFENDANTS?
PoiNT~

II.

IF THERE IS A PUBLIC ROAD AT THE PLACE
INDICATED IN POINT I, WHERE IS THE EAST
BOUNDARY OF THE ROAD AS IT PASSES
ALONG THE WEST SIDE OF APPELLANT'S
PROPERTY?

4
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ARGUMENT
rrhe two questions involved in this lawsuit are ultimate questions of fact and the legal questions· are concerned with the legal effect of the evidence in establishing
the ultimate question of fact.
PoiNT

I.

IS THERE A PUBLIC ROAD RUNNING NORTH
AND SOUTH BETWEEN THE PROPERTY ·oF
APPELLANTS AND THE PROPERTY OF
DEFENDANTS?
Respondents claim, and the Court so found, that
Erekson Lane as it runs north and south between the
property of Appellants on the east and the defendants
on the west is a public road.
First, let us refer to the Decree entered in Case No.
40279 in 1928 by Judge Chris Mathison. In this case
Judge :Mathison found that Erekson Lane from the north
boundary of appellant's property to Vine Street to be a
public road 46 feet wide. The road as it passes appellant's property is bounded on the west by an old fence
surrounded by a privet hedge. The east boundary is identified by a fence 50 feet east of the west fence for the
northerly 40 feet. It then jogs west 10 feet and the fence
then runs at a distance of 40 feet from the west fence to
the garage. The west line of the garage is approximately
25 feet from the west line, then the fence from the south
side of the garage runs in a southeasterly direction. A ppellants did not at any time contend that there was ever

5
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

a fence or any other obstruction in the road, or that it was
ever narrower than 50 feet for the north 40 feet of
appellant's property.
The abstract of title of Respondent Crabtree is in
evidence as Defendant's Exhibit 12. This abstract discloses that the Patent was issued in 1891, but as far back
as June 26, 1875, the patentee conveyed the property of
Defendant Crabtree, and commenced the description as
follows:
''Beginning at a point in the center of a north and
south County Road 4.12 chains true East from
the northeast corner of the Southwest Quarter of
the Northwest Quarter of Section 17, • • • ''
This Deed clearly indicates that the parties thereto considered that a County road existed at the point in question, and in view of the fact that the patent to this land
had not been issued, it could only have become a County
road by user pursuant to the provisions of 43 U.S.C..A.
932, which provides:
'' • ~ • the right of way for the construction of
public highways over public lands not reserved
for public uses is hereby granted.''
Patents are issued subject to existing rights of way, so
respondents contend that there has been a County road
at the point in question since at least 1875.
The Erekson abstract, in evidence as Defendant's
Exhibit 13, at Entry 3 identifies a north-south County
road at the point in question, the Deed being dated in
1901. The abstract of title to appellant's property in
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evidence as Exhibit 7, and the conveyances running as far
back as 1877 have the following opening the description:
'·'Commencing in the center of an open street about
four chains East from the Southwest Quarter of
the Northwest Quarter of Section 17 * * *~''
(See Entries numbers 6, 7, 8, 12, 19, 21, 23, 28, 29, 30, 34,
35 and 43)
All of these descriptions, in addition to commencing
in the center of au open street, also describe the west line
of appellant's property as a straight line running due
North and South. It is interesting to note also that the
means of ingress and egress to and from appellant's
property has been by way of Ereksou Lane, and if their
right to the use of the lane was predicated on some type
of a private easement, it is to be noted that there is nothing in the abstract to indicate such private right, and
there likewise is no grant of such right contained in any
of the deeds of conveyance to said property. It is acknowledged that the conveyances convey rights of way
and appurtenances, but such a valuable right as the right
of ingress and egress, if it were a private right, would
certainly have been identified in the several conveyances.
In addition to the documentary evidence above referred to, Respondent Clark, who resided in the property
of appellants from 1935 until1953, testified that he traveled from his home south along the lane to 5900 South
Street four or five times each year. (Tr. 83) He testified
that sometimes there were a couple of gates across the
road, but that they were never locked.

7
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Respondent Crabtree, who has been a continuous
resident on the lane since 1934, testified that there was
between 50 and 100 persons who traveled through the lane
each month during the entire period. (Tr. 106) He also
testified that the County had used its snow removal equipment to clear the lane; that at times they have graded the
road (Tr. 108), and they have put in a culvert in the lane ..
(Tr. 109)
I

Joe Gillham, a witness called on behalf of respondents, testified that from about 1890 until 1910 he was a
member of the South Cottonwood Ward, and that in going
to and from the meeting house would go East on 59th
South to. Erekson Lane thence North along the lane past
the property in question to the meeting house. (Tr. 134)
That at that time there were no gates on the lane.
Mr. Gillham, on cross-examination, stated that the
lane was 50 feet wide as it passed the property of appellants. (Tr. 135-6) That at that time there were no fences
on either side of the lane south of the property of appellants. He said that all of his neighbors traveled this same
route, and he named some of them and indicated that
they traveled on foot, or by team, surrey or buggy.
(Tr. 133)
Brent Grau:fi.n, called as a witness by respondents,
testified that he was Principal of the Mid Valley School
in the Jordan District, and was a nephew of Respondent
Erekson's wife, and that from 1915 until1927 (Tr. 140),
he spent many of his summers at the home of Respond-
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ent Erekson, and that he was very familiar with Erekson Lane, and particularly that part of it between appellant's property and Respondent Crabtree. He prepared
plaintiff's Exhibit 10 from measurements and field notes
that he had made in connection with T. F. McDonald, a
licensed surveyor, for whom he worked at odd times. He
further testified that from 1918 to 1928 that nearly every
day there would be carriages, and sometimes automobiles,
traveling through the lane. ( Tr. 148) He identified some
of the people who traveled through the lane, and that
some people used it that he was not acquainted with, and
that some would travel down to the creek and go fishing.
(Tr. 149)
Horace Godfrey, a witness called on behalf of Respondents, testified that from 1890 to 1903 he frequently
had occasion to travel through Erekson's Lane (Tr. 162),
and that during that period he saw many other people
using the road, and at that time the condition and width
of Erekson Lane was comparable to that of Vine Street.
(Tr. 167)
Irene Litson Ottley, a witness called on behalf of
respondents, testified that she had lived in the vicinity of
6344 South 7th East since 1884, and she was very well
acquainted with Erekson Lane (Tr. 168), and that on
many occasions she traveled from Vine Street to 59th
South by way of Erekson Lane, usually walking, but occasionally riding in a wagon; that she saw many, many
other people using the lane during the period, some of
whom she named. ( rrr. 169)
9
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Respondent J. T. Erekson testified that he had lived
at his present address, 766 East Vine Street, since 1918,
and that he can remember Erekson Lane for about sixty
years. (Tr. 174) That the County had put gravel on the
road at different times. (Tr. 182) That there has always
been substantial travel through the lane (Tr. 175), and
that the volume of traffic was fairly constant from 1900
to 1920, but with the coming of automobiles there was a
smaller volume of traffic because of having to ford the
creek. (Tr. 176)
James Orland Tho rum, a witness called on behalf
of respondents, testified that he had lived at 482 East
59th South since 1900, and that he had been acquainted
with Erekson Lane for many years, and that from 1900
to 1912 (Tr. 194), he traveled through Erekson Lane
once or twice each week, and generally on Sundays he
would :find other people using the lane at the same time.
(Tr. 195)
Earl E. Howe, a witness called on behalf of Respondents, testified that he has been familiar with Erekson Lane
for 50 years, and in response to the question by Counsel
for respondent as to the travel on the lane, he answered·:
''Yes. It is traveled considerably.''
James M. Dunster, a witness called on behalf of Respondents, testified that he frequently had used Erekso11
Lane (Tr. 205), and that he would bring beet pulp from
West Jordan Sugar Factory to his home by going East
on 59th South to Erekson Lane, thence North on Erekson
Lane to Vine Street.
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more than sixty years last past, so the location of the east
boundry of the road can best be determined as being at
some appropriate distance east of the west boundry. This
method is also indicated by virtue of the fact that the west
quarter corner of Section 17, to which the surveys of the
property in question has been tied, is presently represented by two different monuments, each of which purports to be the true quarter corner. (Tr. 110)
The evidence shows without dispute that prior to
1924 the garage was located on the easterly part of appellants' property, and there were no trees west of the
pond. The evidence further shows that the artificial pond,
which, prior to 1924, extended in to the 50-foot roadway
some 20 or 25 feet, was filled in my the then owner of
appellants' property, a man by the name of Shafer. (Tr.
178; Tr. 146) Shafer filled the pond from dirt from the
roadway. Prior to that time there had not been a fence
between the road and the pond as testified to by appellants' witness, Earl Home. (Tr. 201) After the pond
had been filled in the then owner of the property, Shafer,
built the fence between the pond and the road at a point
40 feet east of the west fence line. (Tr. 202; Tr. 179;
Tr. 147) About 1924 Schryver, the then owner of appellants' property, moved the garage, which had theretofore been a cow barn, out into the road, and a few years
thereafter planted some trees to the north of there in
the roadway. (Tr. 152; Tr. 178) Appellants apparently
sought to establish their right to the land where the trees
and garage were located on the basis, as attorney for
appellant Clark stated: "By adverse possession and pre-
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scriptive· use." (Tr.· 46) This very statement presupposes that prior to the time that the garage and trees
were located at their present site the land in qustion was
part of the public road. Their position has changed and
now seeins to be that the road always ran to the west of
where the trees and garage are now located. In other
words, that Erekson Lane as it proceeded· southerly was
at a rather uniform width of from 46 to 50 feet until it
got to this particular point where all of a sudden it narrowed to 25 feet, and after passing appellants' prope~y
iinmediately widened out to a 40 to 50 foot road. It is submitted that there is no evidence whatsoever to support
this proposition, but on the contrary, the only evidence
is that the road was approximately 50 feet in width
throughout its distance from Vine Street to 59th South.
(Tr. 135; Tr. 181; Tr. 182; Tr. 146)
On the question of width this Court has had the following to say :
In Jeremy v. Bertagnole, 101 Ut.1, Utah, 1941,116 P.
( 2d) 420, the Court found a public way to be 60 feet in
with in places and 5 rods in other places.
''Before doing so, however, it is proper to observe
that even as to pedestrians and vehicular traffic,
where the evidence establishes dedication of a
roadway as in this case, the width of such roadway is not to be by the court measured by the
boundaries of the beaten track. 'It was proper and
necessary for the court in defining the road to determine its width, and to fix the same according
to what was reasonable and necessary, under all
the facts and circumstances, for the uses which
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The appropriate law applicable to the above facts
is as follows :
Utah Code Anrnotated, 1953:

Sec. 27·-1-1. "Public highways" defined. In all counties all roads, streets, alleys, lanes,
courts, places, trails and bridges laid out or erected
as such by the public, or dedicated or abandoned
to the public, or made such in actions for the partition of real property, are public highways.
Sec. 27-1-2. Public use constituting dedication.- A highway shall be deemed to have been
dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public
when it has been continuously used as a public
thoroughfare for a period of ten years.
Sec. 27-1-3. Highways once established continue until abandoned. -All highways once established must continue to be highways until abandoned by order of the board of county commissioners of the county in which they are situated, or
other competent authority.
The latest declaration of this Court on the subject
is found in Boyer v. Clark, 7 U 2d 391, Utah 1958, 326 P.
( 2d) 107, where the Court said :
''The uncontradicted evidence in the instant case
disclosed that for a period exceeding 50 years, the
public, even though not consisting of a great many
persons, made a continuous and uninterrupted use
of Middle Canyon Road in traveling by wagon and
other vehicles and by horse from Upton to Grass
Creek and other points as often as they found it
convenient or necessary. They trailed cattle, and
sheep, hauled coal, and used this trail for other
purposes in traveling from Grass Creek and various other points to and from Highway 133. This
11
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evidence was sufficient as a matter of law to establish a highway by dedication and the court erred in
finding otherwise. The highway once having been
established by such use, it is provided by statute,
Sec. 27-1-3, U.C.A. 1953, that it '* * * must continue to be highway(s) until abandoned by order
of the board of county commissioners * * * or other
competent authority.'' There is no contention that
any such procedure has been invoked here.''
See also: Wilson v. Hull, 7 Ut 90, Utah 1890, 24 P. 799
Whittaker v. Ferguson, 16 Ut. 240, Utah 1889, 51
P. 980.
By virtue of the fact that the appellants offered no
testimony whatsoever to contradict the testimony of the
witnesses hereinbefore referred to, coupled with the fact
that Counsel for appellants Clark predicated their claim
to the land where the garage and trees are located, on the
basis of adverse possession and prescriptive use (Tr.
75-6), it seems clear that Erekson Lane is a public road
and has been since prior to patent, and certainly the
evidence amply supports the proposition that for more
than ten years there has been continuous use of the road
by the public, and there is no evidence of any abandon'"
ment of the road by the county commissioners.
POINT\

II.

IF THERE IS A PUBLIC ROAD AT THE PLACE
INDICATED IN POINT I, WHERE IS THE EAST
BOUNDARY OF THE ROAD AS IT PASSES
ALONG THE WEST SIDE OF APPELLANT'S
PROPERTY?
All of the testimony indicates that the 'vest boundary
of Erekson Lane is now situated where it has been for
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I

I

(

were made of the road.' Lindsay Land & Live
Stock Co. v. Churnos, supra. In Whitesides v.
Green, 13 Utah 341,44 P.1032, 1033 57 Am St. Rep.
740, in discussing the question here involved, this
court said:
" 'Counsel for the appellant appear to insist that
the public have only a right to travel on the beaten
path, and must be confined to one rod in width.
We cannot agree with counsel that, where the
public have acquired the right to a public highway
by user, they are limited to such width as has
actually been used by them. Generally, the greater
part of the travel on a county highway is doubtless
confined to the track made by vehicles, but there
must be room enough for travelers with wagons,
carriages, or implements to pass each other, and
for necessary improvements and repairs to be
made so as to keep it in a suitable condition. The
right acquired by prescription and use carries with
it such width as is reasonably necessary for the
public easement of travel, and where the public
have acquired the easement the land subject to it
has passed under the jurisdiction of the public
authorities, for the purpose of keeping the same
in proper condition for the enjoyment thereof by
the public. Such authorities are bound to keep
the road open and in suitable repair, and, if obstructions be placed thereon, it is their duty to
remove the same, and care for the rights of the
public. • "" * The purpose for which the easement
was acquired must determine the effect of the
right parted with by the owner, and the width necessary for the enjoyment of the highway by the
public. Where the easement is acquired by prescription or use such width must be determined
from a consideration of the facts and circumstances peculiar to the case, because in such event
the court cannot say that in law the highway is of
a certain width, in the absence of statutory pro-
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VISion. "" * * Whatever may be the width in any
particular case, the easement cannot be limited,
when acquired by user, to the actual beaten
path.' "
"(3) Hence, while it is true as contended by
appellant, that where dedication is established by
user to which the way has been put measures the
extent of the right to use, this limitation goes to
the kind of use. A particular use having been established, such width should be decreed by the
court as will make such use convenient and safe.
A bridle path abandoned to the public may not be
expanded, by court decree, into a boulevard. On
the other hand, the implied dedication of a roadway to automobile traffic is the dedication of a
roadway of sufficient width for safe and convenient
use thereof by such traffic. ''
Respondents content that the mere fact that a depression in the earth has been filled with water to form
a pond which projects into a public road does not cause
the land under the water to lose its character as a public
road. The mere fact that vehicles could not not travel
through the pond is not conclusive as the width of the
road.
This Court has pointed out in Wilso·n v. Hull, supra,
that where the evidence established
''There were two or three sloughs, at rainy times,
that were impassible; and that it was laid out four
rods in width, and was upon the line hetween the
sections • • * ' '
did not take the impassable portion out of the road, and in
Din.dsa.y v. Churn,os, Utah 1930, 75 Ut. 384, 285 P. 646, the
finding were, among others, that :
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"During the last four or five years the road in
places has become impassable to ordinary vehicles
and has been used only in driving animals, pack
outfits, etc., over it.''
still it was a road.
See also: Deseret Livestock Company v. Sharp, 123
Ut. 353, Utah, 1953, 259 P. (2d) 607.
Respondents contend that the pond extended into the
road; first, the boundaries of both appellants and respondents are a straight line as they abut upon the road; second, the pond is an artificial pond; and third, Shafer,
when the owner of the property, filled the part of the pond
projecting into the road and built a fence along the east
side of the fill, and this constituted a dedication or admission by the then owner as to the width of the road.
Again, it is important to observe that the only question before the Court in Case No. 40279 (supra) con-:
cerned the existence of a public road, and its width be,..
tween the property of plaintiff and defendant in that case.
It is the same question as the one involved in this matter except that it involves different parties, and at a point
immediately south but upon the same road as Case No.
40279. Whether the Erekson Lane is a public road beyond the property of appellants is not a question now
before this Court. However, it is to be noted that Respondent Erekson, who is the owner of the land upon
both sides of the road between Respondents' property
and 5600 South Street, has testified that it is a public
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road and hence it would be difficult for him at some future
date to change his position.
It is important to remember that all public roads are
not through roads, many of them are cul de sacs. Appellant Thompson has no private way on Erekson Lane, and
Clark, who has reserved for himself the property south
of the creek, has not reserved any way for him to get in
and out of this property if Erekson Lane is not a public
road.
REPLY TO SPECIFIC POINTS IN THE BRIEFS
OF RESPONDENTS
Respondent Clark first raises the point that there is
no evidence of any "formal dedication" of Erekson
Lane. Section 27·-1-1, supra, indicates that dedication is
only one of a number of ways in which land becomes a
public highway. There is no provision in our statutes
aside from subdivision ordinances of cities and counties
wherein there is a formal dedication of a public highway.
There is no contention by respondents that there was a
formal dedication of Erekon Lane, but rather that' 'it was
laid out - by the public - ' ', and hence became a public
highway.
Respondent Clark then points out that there is no.
evidence of any objection by the neighbors to the use of
Erekson Lane. We assume that. he means there is no evidence of objection by abutting property owners. This is
true, but appellant thereupon concludes that it was a
permissive use, and hence that no rights accrued either
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to the public or to the users as private citizens. This argument carried to its ultimate conclusion would deprive
both of appellants from any use of Erekon Lane because
there would be no public road and there would be no private easement. We cannot believe that appellants intend
to advance this proposition. On the other hand, if Ereksoil Lane is a public road, as contended by respondents, it
would be unusual to expect the abutting property owners
to register any complaints because of the use of the road
by the public.
Appellant Clark's last point is that respondent Crabtree wanted the lane widened. This undoubtedly was wishful thinking on Mr. Crabtree's part, but his position is
that the lane should be restored to its original width, that
is, the distance between the two fences prior to the time
that the garage building was placed in the street and the
trees planted in the street.
Relative to the trees, it is unique to have appellants
contend that by planting trees in a public street that they
can thereby acquire some right in and to the street. It
is common knowledge that trees are planted in the public
highways by abutting property owners as part of their
landscaping programs, and it is unique to have anyone
contend that by so doing they can acquire an interest in
the street adverse to the public.
Appellant Thompson, on page 2 of his Brief, says
the undisputed facts show that the maximum width of the
land in front of appellants' property has been 24.6 feet.
It is undisputed that the fences on the north 40 feet of
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appellants' property have been 50 feet east of the west
fence line. (Tr. 142; Ex. 10; Tr. 181) The foundations of
the old coops fronting on the street are still intact; and
the undisputed evidence is that the fence was fastened
to these coops.
The plats attached to Respondent Thompson's Briefs
are misleading, in that they indicate a road only 25 feet
wide north of the Thompson property, whereas, the fact
is that the Decree in Case No. 40279 establishes a road
46 feet wide. Respondent Thompson at page 8 makes a
point of the fact" that the users of the road can be placed
in various categories. He seems to feel that people gomg
to church are no longer citizens. He overlooks the fact
that practically all of the witnesses testified that persons used the street whom they could not identify, so it is
difficult to see what category respondent -has placed these
unknown persons in. He also fails to put Mr. Dunster, his
own witness, in any category when he was hauling beet
pulp through this road. On page 9 he makes reference to
permissive use, and on page 12 to the_ planting of trees,
both of which have been discussed above. On page 15 he
makes reference to the fact that the culYerts, which are
all north of appellants' property, do not extend the full
width of the 46 foot road. We believe it is proper to take
notice of the fact that bridges, culverts and siJ:nilar devices for crossing water courses do not, except on the
most recent and modern of highways, extend the full
width of the right of way, and it is not unsual that this
should be true of Erekson Laue. On page 20 he raises
the point that respondents and the trial court are widenI

20
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ing Erekon Lane. This begs the question. Respondents
are trying to remove an obstruction from the lane and
have its boundaries restored to their historic location.

Section 78-12·-13, provides that there can be no adverse interest acquired in a public road:
''Adverse possession of public streets or ways. No person shall be allowed to acquire any right or
title in or to any lands held by any town, city or
county, or the corporate authorities thereof, designated for public use as streets, lanes, avenues,
alleys, parks or public squares or for any other
public purpose, by adverse possession thereof for
any length of time whatsoever, unless it shall affirmatively appear that such town or city or county
or the corporate authorities thereof have sold, or
otherwise disposed of, and conveyed such real
estate to a purchaser for a valuable consideration,
and that for more than seven years subsequent to
such conveyance the purchaser, his grantees or
successors in interest, have been in the exclusive,
continuous and adverse possession of such real
estate; in which case an adverse title may be
acquired."

Sections 27-1-12, -13, -14, -15, ·-16, -17, U.C.A. 1953,
provide for methods by which the public authorities may
romove encroachments from the public highways. It
seems altogether fitting and proper that the Court in this
action, in which private citizens are endeavoring to enforce a public right, should apply the public remedy to
the removal of the obstructions.
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Finally, the point is made that beyond and to the
south of that part of the road now under consideration
there have from time to time been gates placed across the
road. These gates have not been in existence continuously bcause witness Dunster testified there were no
gates there when he traveled the road in the 1890's. The
evidence is undisputed that the gates were not closed
except on rare occasions and were never locked. This
Court considered this problem in the case of Sullivan v.
Conda.s, 76 Ut. 595, Utah 1930, 290 P. 954, where the road

was established in much the same way as Erekson Lane,
and on this the Court had the following to say:
''There is ample and satisfactory evidence to show
that as early as 1873 the roadway extended up and
down the canyon over the lands now owned by the
plaintiffs and the defendant and others, while such
lands were a part of the public domain, and was
traveled and used by the public generally as occasion required in going up and down the canyon.
The patent to the land issued to the predecessors
in interest of the plaintiffs was issued in 1906,
about thirty-three years thereafter. The plaintiffs acquired their interest in the lands in 1922
or in 1924. The right of way having been established over public lands by public user, the predecessors of the plaintiffs when the patent was
issued to them, and the plaintiffR when they
acquired their interest in and to the lands, took
them subject to the easement in favor of the public,
unless it was thereafter extinguished by operation
of the state law, which was not done."
Relative to the gates maintained by plaintiff, the Court
had the following to say :
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"A further point is made that gates were put up
by the plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest,
thereby indicating that the character of the roadway was a private roadway and interrupted the
use of it. But there is ample evidence to show that
whatever gates or fences were put up were erected
after the roadway had for many years been established and used as a public highway by the public
generally and by those who had occasion to use it
and was so continued to be used after as before
whatever gates or fences were erected.''
The New Hampshire Court held that an owner cannot bar
use of a public way once established by putting up bars
part of the time. Town of Windham v. Jubinville, 92 New
Hampshire 102,25 A. (2d) 415.
See: Bolger v. Foss, 65 Cal. 250, California 1884,

3 P. 871,
where, after the Court had found a way to be a public
road had the following to say about gates:
"The fact, as found, that in the fall of 1877 the
plaintiff placed gates at the points where the road
entered upon and emerged from this land, which
did not prevent the passage across it, does not
overcome the effect of the finding that the road
was used as a public road; nor does the fact that
plaintiff, a 'short time' before he commenced this
action, notified defendant that it was not a public
road.''
·
To the same effect see: Barnes v. Daveck, 7 CA 220, California 1907, 94 P. 779.
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CONCLUSION
Respondents maintain that a public- street was laid
out prior to the issuance of a patent and became a NorthSouth county road pursuant to 43 U.S.C.A. 932, and in
addition thereto, the evidence conclusively shows user
for more than ten years prior to 1900 and continuous use
since. There is no evidence of any abandonment of the
road by any duly constituted public authority or otherwise, and Erekson Lane is now and for many years last
past has been a public street. That fifty feet is a reasonable and necessary width of the street and the
encroachment of the ponds at one time as an artificial
obstacle is no eidence of a narrower width. That established fence lines justify a finding of a fifty-foot width,
and that the use of gates by Erekson have not at any time
interfered with the public use of the street, and could
not under the law interfere with its use.
Respectfully submitted,
MOFFAT, IVERSON and ELGGREN
By D. HowE MoFFAT
Attorneys for Respondents
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